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Abstract
Results from Nie and Rutkowski [12, 14] are extended to the case of the margin account,
which may depend on the contract’s value for the hedger and/or the counterparty (recall that
the collateral was given exogenously in [12, 14]). The present work generalizes also the papers by
Bergman [1], Mercurio [11] and Piterbarg [16]. Using the comparison theorems for BSDEs, we
derive inequalities for the unilateral prices and we give the range for its fair bilateral prices. We
also establish results yielding the link to the market model with a single interest rate. In the case
where the collateral amount is negotiated between the counterparties, so that it depends on their
respective unilateral values, the backward stochastic viability property studied by Buckdahn et
al. [4] is used to derive the bounds on fair bilateral prices.
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2 T. Nie and M. Rutkowski
1 Introduction
In Bielecki and Rutkowski [2], the authors introduced a generic nonlinear market model which
includes several risky assets, multiple funding accounts, as well as the margin account for collateral
(for related studies by other authors, see also [3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16]). We continue their study by
examining the pricing and hedging of a derivative contract from the perspective of the hedger and
his counterparty. Since we work within a nonlinear trading framework, the prices computed by the
two parties of a contract do not necessarily coincide and thus our goal is to compare these prices
and to derive the range for no-arbitrage bilateral prices. As emphasized in [2, 12, 13], the initial
endowments of the hedger and the counterparty become important factors in arbitrage pricing in
the nonlinear setup. In [12, 14], we studied collateralized contracts in the model with partial netting
and Bergman’s model, respectively. Using comparison theorems for BSDEs, we derived the range for
either fair bilateral prices or bilaterally profitable prices. It should be stressed that in [12, 14], the
collateral amount was assumed to be exogenously specified and thus it was independent of unilateral
values of the contract for the two parties. By contrast, we study here a more realistic situation
where the collateral is endogenous, meaning that it may depend on the marked-to-market value of
the contract either for one party (say, the hedger) or it is negotiated between them. Although we
focus here on two particular instances of market models, it is clear that the method developed in
this work can be applied to a large variety of models and/or collateral covenants.
Motivated by the seminal paper by Bergman [1], we first consider an extension of his trading
model to the case of endogenous collateral. To the best of our knowledge, the case of endogenous
collateral was not studied in the existing literature, except for the special case of the proportional
collateral examined by Piterbarg [16] and Mercurio [11]. We give here essential extensions of their
results using the BSDE approach. First, we consider general collateralized contracts, rather only than
path-independent European claims. Second, in [11], the collateralization of the hedger (resp., the
counterparty) was postulated to be a constant proportion of the hedger’s (resp., the counterparty’s)
value, which apparently means that the two parties either post or receive the collateral amounts
specified by two different margin accounts. This is clearly inconsistent with the market practice
where the collateral amount posted by one party coincides with the amount received by another
party. We derive inequalities satisfied by unilateral prices of a contract and we give the range for
its fair bilateral prices. We show that if the collateralization depends on the values for the hedger
and the counterparty, the backward stochastic viability property (BSVP) plays an important role
in derivation of pricing inequalities. Motivated by results from the papers by Buckdahn et al. [4]
and Hu and Peng [10], we obtain the range of fair bilateral prices for European contingent claims.
In the second step, we consider the market model with partial netting under the assumption of
full rehypothecation of the cash collateral. Once again, in contrast with our previous work [12], we
study here the case of the collateral depending on the hedger’s value and/or counterparty’s value.
We establish similar results as for Bergman’s model. It is worth noting, however, that the model with
partial netting enjoys some additional properties with respect to the class of monotone contracts,
which are not necessarily shared by Bergman’s model. This emphasizes the impact of asset-specific
funding costs on properties of hedging strategies and prices of contracts.
The work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some definitions and assumptions
introduced in our previous works [2, 12, 14]. In Section 3 and 4, we examine extensions of the model
studied by Bergman [1] and Mercurio [11]. In Section 3, we consider the case where the collateral
depends only on the hedger’s value and we establish inequalities for unilateral prices of a general
contract. Moreover, we extend the results from [11] regarding the relationship to the market model
with a single uncertain interest rate. In Section 4, we study the case where the collateral depends on
both the hedger’s and the counterparty’s values under the assumption that the risky asset is driven
by a Brownian motion. Using the BSVP technique from [4], we derive the inequalities for unilateral
prices. In Sections 5 and 6, we examine the model with partial netting and we obtain similar results
for the range of fair bilateral prices. We also show that the model with partial netting has some
additional properties of independence of the initial endowment and/or positive homogeneity with
respect to particular classes of contracts. We thus conclude that no unified theory can be developed
in the non-linear framework, so that each particular setup should be studied on a standalone basis.
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2 Preliminaries
We provide here a very brief summary of concepts and notation introduced in [2, 12, 14]. For more
details and explanations, the reader is referred to the original papers. Let T > 0 be a fixed finite
trading horizon date for our model of the financial market. We denote by (Ω,G,G,P) a filtered
probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness, where the
filtration G = (Gt)t∈[0,T ] models the flow of information available to all traders. For convenience, we
assume that the initial σ-field G0 is trivial. Moreover, all processes introduced in what follows are
implicitly assumed to be G-adapted and any semimartingale is assumed to be ca`dla`g. As in [12, 14],
for any i = 1, 2, . . . , d, we use the following notation for the market data:
A – a bilateral financial contract, or simply a contract. The process A is finite variation and it
represents the cumulative cash flows of a given contract from time 0 till its maturity date T ,
C – the cash collateral, specified as a G-adapted process satisfying CT = 0,
Si – the ex-dividend price of the ith risky asset with the cumulative dividend stream Ai,
Bl (resp., Bb) – the lending (resp., borrowing) cash account,
Bi,l (resp., Bi,b) – the lending (resp., borrowing) funding account associated with the ith risky asset,
Bc – the process specifying the interest paid/received on the collateral account received/posted.
Assumption 2.1 We work throughout under the following assumptions:
(i) Si is a semimartingale and Ai is a process of finite variation with Ai0 = 0.
(ii) the processes Bl, Bb, Bi,l, Bi,b and Bc are strictly positive, continuous processes of finite variation
with Bl0 = B
b
0 = B
i,l
0 = B
i,b
0 = B
c
0 = 1.
(iii) in the case of a model with partial netting, we also assume that Bi,l = Bl for every i,
(iv) dBlt = r
l
tB
l
t dt, dB
b
t = r
b
tB
b
t dt, dB
i,b
t = r
i,b
t B
i,b
t dt and dB
c
t = r
c
tB
c
t dt, for some G-adapted and
bounded processes rl, rb, ri,b and rc. Moreover, we postulate that 0 ≤ rl ≤ rb and rl ≤ ri,b.
We define the interest process of the margin account by setting FCt := −
∫ t
0 r
c
uCu du for every t
and we denote AC := A + C + FC . For a collateralized hedger’s trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C), we
write:
(i) Vt(x, ϕ,A,C) – the hedger’s wealth at time t,
(ii) V pt (x, ϕ,A,C) – the value of hedger’s portfolio at time t.
Note that V pt (x, ϕ,A,C)−Vt(x, ϕ,A,C) = Ct measures the impact of the margin account repre-
sented by the collateral amount Ct on the hedger’s trading strategy under the standing assumption
of full rehypothecation. Finally, we set V 0t (x) := xB
l
T1{x≥0} + xB
b
T1{x<0} where x = x1 (resp.,
x = x2) is the initial endowment of the hedger (resp., the counterparty) at time 0.
Definition 2.1 Any Gt-measurable random variable for which a replicating strategy for A over [t, T ]
exists is called the hedger’s ex-dividend price at time t for a contract (A,C) and it is denoted by
P ht (x1, A, C), so that for some self-financing trading strategy ϕ, which replicates (A,C), we have
VT (V
0
t (x1) + P
h
t (x1, A, C), ϕ, A −At, C) = V
0
T (x1).
For an arbitrary level x2 of the counterparty’s initial endowment and a strategy ϕ˜ replicating
(−A,−C), the counterparty’s ex-dividend price P ct (x2,−A,−C) at time t for a contract (−A,−C)
is implicitly given by the equality
VT (V
0
t (x2)− P
c
t (x2,−A,−C), ϕ˜,−A+ At,−C) = V
0
T (x2).
By a fair bilateral price, we mean any level of the price at which no arbitrage opportunity arises
for either of the two parties. Hence the range of fair bilateral prices at time t is formally defined as
follows.
Definition 2.2 The Gt-measurable interval
Rft (x1, x2) :=
[
P ct (x2,−A,−C), P
h
t (x1, A, C)
]
is called the range of fair bilateral prices at time t of an OTC contract (A,C) between the hedger
and the counterparty.
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3 Bergman’s Model with Hedger’s Collateral
In Sections 3 and 4, we consider an extended version of the model studied by Bergman [1]. For a
detailed analysis of this model, we refer to the recent work by Nie and Rutkowski [14]. Note that in
this framework the funding accounts Bi,l and Bi,b are not introduced.
Following [2, 12, 14], we introduce the auxiliary processes S˜i,l,cld and S˜i,b,cld, which are given by
the following expressions, for i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
S˜
i,l,cld
t := (B
l
t)
−1Sit +
∫
(0,t]
(Blu)
−1 dAiu
and
S˜
i,b,cld
t := (B
b
t )
−1Sit +
∫
(0,t]
(Bbu)
−1 dAiu.
It is easy to see that the dynamics of these processes are
dS˜
i,l,cld
t = (B
l
t)
−1
(
dSit + dA
i
t − r
l
tS
i
t dt
)
(3.1)
and
dS˜
i,b,cld
t = (B
b
t )
−1
(
dSit + dA
i
t − r
b
tS
i
t dt
)
. (3.2)
As in [14], we consider an arbitrary self-financing trading strategy ϕ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd, ϕl, ϕb, ηl, ηb)
where ηlt = (B
c,l
t )
−1C−t and η
b
t = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C+t . Since we assume here that B
c,l
t = B
c,b
t = B
c
t , a
trading strategy ϕ reduces to (ξ1, . . . , ξd, ϕl, ϕb, η) where ηt = −(B
c
t )
−1Ct. Let us denote
A
C,l
t :=
∫
(0,t]
(Blu)
−1 dACu , A
C,b
t :=
∫
(0,t]
(Bbu)
−1 dACu .
From Proposition 2.9 in [14], it is known that the process Y l := (Bl)−1V p(x, ϕ,A,C) satisfies
dY lt =
d∑
i=1
Z
l,i
t dS˜
i,l,cld
t +Gl(t, Y
l
t , Z
l
t) dt+ dA
C,l
t (3.3)
where Z l,i := ξi, i = 1, 2, . . . , d and the generator Gl is given by the following expression, for all
(ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× R× Rd,
Gl(t, y, z) =
d∑
i=1
rlt(B
l
t)
−1ziSit + (B
l
t)
−1
(
rlt
(
yBlt −
d∑
i=1
ziSit
)+
− rbt
(
yBlt −
d∑
i=1
ziSit
)−)
− rlty.
Similarly, the process Y b := (Bb)−1V p(x, ϕ,A,C) is governed by
dY bt =
d∑
i=1
Z
b,i
t dS˜
i,b,cld
t +Gb(t, Y
b
t , Z
b
t ) dt+ dA
C,b
t (3.4)
where Zb,i = ξi, i = 1, 2, . . . , d and the generator Gb equals, for all (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]×R×R
d,
Gb(t, y, z) =
d∑
i=1
rbt (B
b
t )
−1ziSit + (B
b
t )
−1
(
rlt
(
yBbt −
d∑
i=1
ziSit
)+
− rbt
(
yBbt −
d∑
i=1
ziSit
)−)
− rbty.
Recall that the initial endowment of the hedger (resp., the counterparty) is denoted by x1 (resp.,
x2). Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that x1 ≥ 0 and we consider an arbitrary
level of x2. Furthermore, in Sections 3 and 5, we work under the following standing assumption of
hedger’s collateral, that is, the situation where the collateral amount only depends on the hedger’s
wealth V h := V (x1, ϕ, A,C).
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Assumption 3.1 The hedger’s collateral C is given by the equality
Ct = q(V
0
t (x1)− V
h
t ) (3.5)
for some uniformly Lipschitz continuous function q : R→ R such that q(0) = 0.
Example 3.1 For instance, the hedger’s collateral C can be specified as in [2] (see equation (4.10)
therein) through the following expression
Ct = (1 + α1)
(
V 0t (x)− V
h
t
)+
− (1 + α2)
(
V 0t (x)− V
h
t
)−
for some bounded haircut processes α1, α2, so that q(y) = (1 + α1)y
+ − (1 + α2)y
−. It is clear that
q is uniformly Lipschitz continuous and q(0) = 0. The case of the fully collateralized contract, from
the perspective of the hedger, is obtained by taking q(y) = y, that is, by setting α1 = α2 = 0.
3.1 Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
We first examine the case where the initial endowments are of the same sign, specifically, we assume
that x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0. The next assumption postulates the existence of a ‘martingale measure’ in
the present setup. All probability measures are assumed to be defined on (Ω,GT ).
Assumption 3.2 There exists a probability measure P˜l equivalent to P such that the processes
S˜i,l,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are (P˜l,G)-local martingales.
The following result is borrowed from [14] (see Proposition 2.1 therein). Let us stress that the
arbitrage-free property is here understood in the sense of [2] (see Section 3.1 therein).
Proposition 3.1 If the initial endowments satisfy x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumption 3.2 is valid, then
Bergman’s model is arbitrage-free for the hedger and the counterparty with respect to any contract
(A,C).
In order to address the issue of bilateral pricing using a BSDE approach, we need to impose
additional assumptions on the dynamics of risky assets. We will work under the following assumption
regarding the quadratic variation process for continuous martingales S˜l,cld. Note that ∗ stands for
the transposition and, as in [12, 14], we define the matrix-valued process S given by
St :=

S1t 0 . . . 0
0 S2t . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Sdt
 .
Assumption 3.3 We postulate that:
(i) there exists a probability measure P˜l equivalent to P such that S˜l,cld is a continuous, square-
integrable, (P˜l,G)-martingale and has the predictable representation property with respect to the
filtration G under P˜l,
(ii) there exists an Rd×d-valued, G-adapted process ml such that
〈S˜l,cld〉t =
∫ t
0
mlu(m
l
u)
∗ du (3.6)
where the process ml(ml)∗ is invertible and satisfies ml(ml)∗ = Sσσ∗S. Here σ is a d-dimensional
square matrix of G-adapted processes satisfying the ellipticity condition: there exists a constant
Λ > 0
d∑
i,j=1
(σtσ
∗
t )ij aiaj ≥ Λ|a|
2 = Λa∗a, ∀ a ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.7)
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Following Nie and Rutkowski [13], but with Qt = t, we denote by Ĥ
2,d
0 the subspace of all
Rd-valued, G-adapted processes X such that
|X |2
Ĥ2,d
0
:= EP
[ ∫ T
0
|Xt|
2 dt
]
<∞ (3.8)
and, for brevity, we write Ĥ20 := Ĥ
2,1
0 . Also, let L̂
2
0 stand for the space of all real-valued, GT -
measurable random variables η such that |η|2
L̂2
0
= EP(η
2) <∞.
Definition 3.1 For any probability measure Q, we denote by A(Q) the following class of a real-
valued, G-adapted processes A(Q) :=
{
X ∈ Ĥ20 and XT ∈ L̂
2
0 under Q
}
.
Definition 3.1 will serve to define the class of admissible contracts with the choice of Q depending
on a particular setup at hand. Let us stress that for any contract (A,C) the statement that A ∈ A(Q)
will mean that the process A − A0 of future cash flows belongs to the class A(Q). Recall that the
initial cash flow A0 of a contract (A,C) represents its initial price, so that is not given a priori.
For the reader’s convenience, we first recall a result concerning the case of an exogenous collateral
C (see Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 in [14], as well as Proposition 5.2 in [2]).
Proposition 3.2 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 be valid. Then for any contract
(A,C) such that AC,l ∈ A(P˜l), the hedger’s ex-dividend price equals P h(x1, A, C) = B
l(Y h,l,x1 −
x1)− C where the pair (Y
h,l,x1, Zh,l,x1) is the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY
h,l,x1
t = Z
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t +Gl
(
t, Y
h,l,x1
t , Z
h,l,x1
t
)
dt+ dAC,lt ,
Y
h,l,x1
T = x1,
(3.9)
and the counterparty’s ex-dividend price equals P c(x2,−A,−C) = −B
l(Y c,l,x2 − x2) + C where the
pair (Y c,l,x2, Zc,l,x2) is the unique solutions to the BSDE{
dY
c,l,x2
t = Z
c,l,x2,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t +Gl
(
t, Y
c,l,x2
t , Z
c,l,x2
t
)
dt− dAC,lt ,
Y
c,l,x2
T = x2.
(3.10)
In the next result, the hedger’s collateral C is given by equation (3.5). Note that the generator
gl depends explicitly on the process Y
1, which in turn is defined as a part of the solution of BSDE
(3.11). This means that the counterparty’s BSDE (3.12) is coupled with the hedger’s BSDE (3.11).
It is thus crucial to note that the hedger’s price P h(x1, A, C) depends only on his initial endowment
x1. By contrast, the counterparty’s price depends on both initial endowments, x1 and x2, so that it
would be suitable to denote it as P c(x1, x2,−A,−C). However, for ease of notation, we shall write
P c(x2,−A,−C), while keeping in mind that this process depends on x1 as well.
Proposition 3.3 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 be valid. Then for any contract
(A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜l), the hedger’s ex-dividend price equals P h := P h(x1, A, C) = Y
1 where
(Y 1, Z1) is the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY 1t = Z
1,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + fl
(
t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y 1T = 0,
(3.11)
with the generator fl given by
fl(t, x1, y, z) = r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1z∗St − x1B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q(−y)
+ rlt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t − (B
l
t)
−1z∗St
)+
− rbt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t − (B
l
t)
−1z∗St
)−
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and the counterparty’s ex-dividend price equals P c := P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y
2 where (Y 2, Z2) is the
unique solution to the BSDE{
dY 2t = Z
2,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + gl
(
t, x2, Y
2
t , Z
2
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y 2T = 0,
(3.12)
with the generator gl given by
gl(t, x2, y, z) = r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1z∗St + x2B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
tq(−Y
1
t )
− rlt
(
− y − q(−Y 1t ) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1z∗St
)+
+ rbt
(
− y − q(−Y 1t ) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1z∗St
)−
.
Proof. Since the collateral amount is not exogenously specified in the present framework, the
process C may depend on the hedger’s value, and thus Proposition 3.2 does not cover the current
situation. However, from the proof of Proposition 5.2 in [2], one can deduce that if BSDEs (3.9)
and (3.10) have a unique solution, then the relationships P h(x,A,C) = Bl(Y h,l,x1 − x1) − C and
P c(x2,−A,−C) = −B
l(Y c,l,x2 − x2) + C are still valid.
It is also worth stressing that we cannot apply directly the results of [13] to solve BSDEs (3.9)
and (3.10), since the process AC depends also on Y h,l,x. However, since P h := Bl(Y h,l,x1 −x1)−C,
we have that P hT = 0 and thus, by letting Z˜
h,l,x1 := BlZh,l,x1 , we obtain
dP ht = B
l
tZ
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + B
l
tGl
(
t, Y
h,l,x1
t , Z
h,l,x1
t
)
dt+ rltB
l
t(Y
h,l,x1 − x) dt+ dACt − dCt
= BltZ
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + r
l
tZ
h,l,x1,∗
t St dt+ r
l
t
(
Y
h,l,x1
t B
l
t − Z
h,l,x1,∗
t St
)+
dt
− rbt
(
Y
h,l,x1
t B
l
t − Z
h,l,x1,∗
t St
)−
dt− rltB
l
tY
h,l,x1
t dt+ r
l
tB
l
t(Y
h,l,x1
t − x1) dt+ dAt + dF
C
t
= Z˜h,l,x1,∗t dS˜
l,cld
t + r
l
t
(
P ht + Ct + x1B
l
t − (B
l
t)
−1Z˜
h,l,x1,∗
t St
)+
dt
− rbt
(
P ht + Ct + x1B
l
t − (B
l
t)
−1Z˜
h,l,x1,∗
t St
)−
dt
− x1r
l
tB
l
t dt+ r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1Z˜
h,l,x1,∗
t St dt+ dAt − r
c
tCt dt.
Moreover, by comparing Proposition 5.2 in [2] with equation (3.3), we deduce easily that Y h,l,x1 =
(Bl)−1V p(x1, ϕ, A,C) and thus
P h = Bl(Y h,l,x1 − x1)− C = V
p(x1, ϕ, A,C) − x1B
l − C = V (x1, ϕ, A,C)− x1B
l.
By applying similar arguments to the counterparty’s pricing problem, we obtain the equality Y c,l,x2 =
(Bl)−1V p(x2, ϕ˜,−A,−C), which in turn yields
P c(x2,−A,−C) = −B
l(Y c,l,x2 − x2) + C = −V (x2, ϕ˜,−A,−C) + x2B
l.
We conclude that if C is given by equation (3.5), then we have Ct = q(V
0
t (x1) − V
h
t ) = q(−P
h
t )
and thus the pair (P h, Z˜h,l,x1) is a solution to BSDE (3.11). Similarly, for Z˜c,l,x2 := −BltZ
c,l,x2, we
deduce that the pair (P c, Z˜c,l,x2) satisfies BSDE (3.12).
It remains to verify that BSDEs (3.11) and (3.12) are indeed well-posed. One can check that
fl(t, x1, 0, 0) = 0 and the mapping fl is uniformly m-Lipschitz generator (for the definition of the
uniformly m-Lipschitz generator, see [13]). Consequently, if A ∈ A(P˜l) then, using Theorem 3.2 in
[13], we conclude that BSDE (3.11) has a unique solution (Y 1, Z1) such that (Y 1,m∗Z1) ∈ Ĥ20×Ĥ
2,d
0 .
Similarly, we note that
gl(t, x2, 0, 0) = x2B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q(−Y
1
t )− r
l
t
(
− q(−Y 1t ) + x2B
l
t
)+
+ rbt
(
− q(−Y 1t ) + x2B
l
t
)−
where q is a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function and Y 1 ∈ Ĥ20, so that gl(t, x2, 0, 0) ∈ Ĥ
2
0.
Moreover, the mapping gl is also a uniformly m-Lipschitz generator, and thus BSDE (3.12) has also
a unique solution (Y 2, Z2) such that (Y 2,m∗Z2) ∈ Ĥ20 × Ĥ
2,d
0 . 
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We are now in a position to examine the range of fair bilateral prices at time t (see Definition
2.2). It appears that, under mild assumptions, this range is non-empty when the initial endowments
of the two parties have the same sign. Let us note that this range may be empty, in general, if the
initial endowments are of opposite signs, that is, when x1 > 0 and x2 < 0 (see Proposition 3.9(ii) in
Section 3.2).
Proposition 3.4 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜l) we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
l − a.s., (3.13)
so that the range of fair bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) is non-empty, P˜
l − a.s.
Proof. In view of Proposition 3.3 and a suitable version of the comparison theorem for BSDEs (see
Theorem 3.3 in [13]), to establish the inequality P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
l−a.s., it suffices
to show that gl
(
t, x2, Y
1, Z1
)
≥ fl
(
t, x1, Y
1, Z1
)
, P˜l⊗ ℓ− a.e.. To demonstrate the latter inequality,
we denote
δ := gl
(
t, x2, Y
1, Z1
)
− fl
(
t, x1, Y
1, Z1
)
= rltB
l
t(x1 + x2)− r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
where
δ1 := −Y
1
t − q(−Y
1
t ) +B
l
tx2 + (B
l
t)
−1Z
1,∗
t St, δ2 := Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) +B
l
tx1 − (B
l
t)
−1Z
1,∗
t St.
Since, by Assumption 2.1, the inequality rl ≤ rb holds, we obtain
δ ≥ rltB
l
t(x1 + x2)− r
l
t(δ1 + δ2) = 0,
which is the required condition. 
Remark 3.1 It is clear that analogous results can be established when the collateral depends only
on the counterparty’s value V c := V (x2, ϕ˜,−A,−C), specifically, when Assumption 3.1 is replaced
by the postulate that Ct = q(V
c
t − V
0
t (x2)) for some uniformly Lipschitz continuous function q such
that q(0) = 0.
Remark 3.2 One can also prove similar results when the initial endowments satisfy x1 ≤ 0 and
x2 ≤ 0, so that they are still of the same sign. The case where the initial endowments have opposite
signs is more challenging and it is analyzed in Section 3.2.
3.1.1 European Claims in a Diffusion Model
The pricing and hedging of collateralized European claims in a diffusion model was recently studied
by Mercurio [11] (see also Piterbarg [16]). It should be pointed out that the hedger’s and coun-
terparty’s initial endowments were implicitly assumed to be null in [11]. More importantly, the
collateral amount for the hedger (resp., for the counterparty) was specified as a constant proportion
of the hedger’s (resp., the counterparty’s) value, that is, it was postulated in [11] that Ch = αV h and
Cc = αV c for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Such a specification of the margin account apparently corresponds
to the situation where the hedger and the counterparty post/receive collateral of possibly different
amounts to/from the third party independently of each other. Obviously, this is inconsistent with
the real-life situation where the margin account is common for both parties, so that the collateral
amount posted (resp., received) by one party is received (resp., posted) by another party.
For simplicity, let us assume d = 1, so that there is only one risky asset, S = S1. This restriction
can be relaxed and thus Corollary 3.1 can be easily extended to the multi-asset framework.
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Assumption 3.4 We assume that:
(i) the risky asset S has the ex-dividend price dynamics under P given by the following expression,
for t ∈ [0, T ],
dSt = µ(t, St) dt+ σ(t, St) dWt, S0 = s ∈ O, (3.14)
whereW is a one-dimensional Brownian motion andO is the domain of real values that are attainable
by the diffusion process S (usually O = R+),
(ii) the filtration G is generated by the Brownian motion W ,
(iii) the coefficients µ and σ are such that SDE (3.14) has a unique strong solution,
(iv) the dividend process equals A1t =
∫ t
0 κ(u, Su) du.
We observe that
dS˜
l,cld
t = (B
l
t)
−1
(
dSt − r
l
tSt dt+ dA
1
t
)
=
(
µ(t, St) + κ(t, St)− r
l
tSt
)
dt+ σ(t, St) dWt.
We denote
at := (σ(t, St))
−1
(
µ(t, St) + κ(t, St)− r
l
tSt
)
(3.15)
and we suppose that a satisfies Novikov’s condition
EP
(
exp
{
1
2
∫ T
0
|at|
2 dt
})
<∞. (3.16)
Let us define the probability measure P˜l by setting
dP˜l
dP
= exp
{
−
∫ T
0
at dWt −
1
2
∫ T
0
|at|
2 dt
}
. (3.17)
From the Girsanov theorem, the probability measure P˜l is equivalent to P and the process W˜ l is the
Brownian motion under P˜l, where dW˜ lt := dWt + at dt. It is easy to see that the dynamics of the
process S˜l,cld under P˜l are
dS˜
l,cld
t = σ(t, St) dW˜
l
t
and thus S˜l,cld is a (P˜l,G)-(local) martingale with the quadratic variation 〈S˜l,cld〉t =
∫ t
0 |σ(u, Su)|
2 du.
Therefore, if (σ(·, S))−1S is bounded, Assumption 3.3 holds, since the Brownian motion W˜ l is known
to have the predictable representation property under (G, P˜l).
Let us comment on the valuation and hedging of a European contingent claim with the hedger’s
collateral given by (3.5). A generic European claim pays at its expiration date T the amount HT to
the hedger, so that
At −A0 = HT1[T,T ](t). (3.18)
We find it convenient to denote such a contract as (HT , C). From Proposition 3.4, we deduce the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 Consider a collateralized European claim (HT , C) where the random variable HT is
square-integrable under P˜l. If x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumption 3.1 is valid, then the range of fair
bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) for (HT , C) is non-empty, P˜
l-a.s.
3.1.2 Model with an Uncertain Money Market Rate
We continue working under the assumption that x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0. Let us select any G-adapted
interest rate process satisfying the following condition
rt ∈ [r
l
t, r
b
t ] for every t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.19)
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We preserve all other assumptions regarding the market model at hand, including the set of traded
risky assets but, for the sake of comparison, we now also consider an additional market model with
the single uncertain money market rate r. To be more specific, part (iv) in Assumption 2.1 becomes:
dBlt = rtB
l
t dt, dB
b
t = rtB
b
t dt and dB
c
t = r
c
tB
c
t dt for some G-adapted and bounded processes r, r
l
and rc. Under these assumptions, the hedger and the counterparty have the same ex-dividend price
P r, which does not depend on their initial endowments. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that
the situation in now fully symmetric since we deal now with a single interest rate. Formally, the
ex-dividend price process P r = Y now coincides with the unique solution to the BSDE{
dYt = Z
∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + f(t, Yt, Zt) dt+ dAt,
YT = 0,
(3.20)
where the generator f is given by the following expression
f(t, y, z) = (rlt − rt)(B
l
t)
−1z∗St − r
c
t q(−y) + rt(y + q(−y)).
The next result is not only more general but, in our opinion, it is also more natural than Propo-
sition 4.1 in Mercurio [11] where, as was already mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.1.1, the
collateral amount for each party was tied to his unilateral value of the contract. Note that the prices
P h(0, A, C) and P c(0,−A,−C) are computed in Bergman’s model with differential borrowing and
lending rates rl and rb under the assumption that x1 = x2 = 0 and the collateral C is given by (3.5).
Proposition 3.5 Consider the market model with the money market rate r.
(i) The price P r of any contract (A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜l) satisfies P r ≤ P h(0, A, C), P˜l − a.s.
(ii) If x1 = x2 = 0 and the function q in equation (3.5) satisfies (rt − r
c
t )(q(y1)− q(y2)) ≤ 0 for all
y1 ≥ y2, then also P
c(0,−A,−C) ≤ P r, P˜l − a.s.
Proof. (i) In view of the comparison theorem for BSDEs (see Theorem 3.3 in [13]), it is sufficient
to show that the inequality fl
(
t, 0, Yt, Zt
)
≤ f
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
≤ gl
(
t, 0, Yt, Zt
)
holds P˜l ⊗ ℓ − a.e.. Let us
denote
δ1 := Yt + q(−Yt) +B
l
tx1 − (B
l
t)
−1Z∗t St.
From the assumption that rt ∈ [r
l
t, r
b
t ] for all t ∈ [0, T ], we obtain
δ := fl
(
t, x1, Yt, Zt
)
− f
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
= rt(B
l
t)
−1Z∗t St − x1B
l
tr
l
t + r
l
tδ
+
1 − r
b
tδ
−
1 − rtYt − rtq(−Yt)
≤ rt(B
l
t)
−1Z∗t St − x1B
l
tr
l
t + rtδ1 − rt(Yt + q(−Yt)) = (rt − r
l
t)x1B
l
t.
Therefore, if x1 = 0, then δ ≤ 0. Consequently, Y ≤ Y
1 and thus P r ≤ P h(0, A, C).
(ii) We now assume that the hedger’s initial endowment is null and we examine the pricing problem
for the counterparty. Recall that we postulate that Ct = q(−Y
1) = q(−P h(0, A, C)). Let us denote
δ2 := −Yt − q(−Y
1
t ) +B
l
tx2 + (B
l
t)
−1Z∗t St.
From rt ∈ [r
l
t, r
b
t ], we obtain
δ˜ := f
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
− gl
(
t, x2, Yt, Zt
)
= −rt(B
l
t)
−1Z∗t St − r
c
t q(−Yt) + r
c
t q(−Y
1
t ) + rt(Yt + q(−Yt))− x2B
l
tr
l
t + r
l
tδ
+
2 − r
b
tδ
−
2
≤ −rt(B
l
t)
−1Z∗t St − r
c
t q(−Yt) + r
c
t q(−Y
1
t ) + rt(Yt + q(−Yt))− x2B
l
tr
l
t + rtδ2
= (rt − r
l
t)x2B
l
t + (rt − r
c
t )(q(−Yt)− q(−Y
1
t )).
Since (rt−r
c
t )(q(y1)−q(y2)) ≤ 0 for all y1 ≥ y2 and Y ≤ Y
1, we have (rt−r
c
t )(q(−Yt)−q(−Y
1
t )) ≤ 0.
Therefore, if x2 = 0, then δ˜ ≤ 0. We conclude that P
c(0,−A,−C) ≤ P r. 
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Remark 3.3 Note that the condition (rt − r
c
t )(q(y1) − q(y2)) ≤ 0 for all y1 ≥ y2 can be easily
ensured. For instance, if q is an increasing function (e.g., the one given in Example 3.1 when
α1, α2 > −1), then it suffices to postulate that rt ≤ r
c
t . When x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0, it is not clear
whether the inequalities P c(x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
r ≤ P h(x1, A, C) are valid. Indeed, Proposition 3.5
only shows that they are valid under the assumption that x1 = x2 = 0.
Remark 3.4 As in Section 5.4 of [12], one can prove the monotonicity and stability properties of
the price with respect to the initial endowment of each party. No difficulty arises in the case of
the hedger’s price. Since the counterparty’s price P c(x1, x2,−A,−C) depends also on the hedger’s
initial endowment, the arguments used in [12] should be slightly modified.
3.2 Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
So far, we worked under the assumption that the initial endowments of both parties are non-negative.
We will now briefly examine the situation where x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. As in our previous work [12], the
concept of a ‘martingale measure’ will now be specified in a more abstract way than in Assumption
3.2 by making reference to some auxiliary process, which is hereafter denoted as β.
Assumption 3.5 We postulate that:
(i) there exists a probability measure P˜β equivalent to P such that the processes S˜i,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
which are given by
dS˜
i,cld
t = dS
i
t + dA
i
t − β
i
tS
i
t dt (3.21)
for some Rd-valued, G-adapted, bounded processes β satisfying rb ≤ βi for i = 1, . . . , d, are (P˜β ,G)-
continuous, square-integrable martingales and have the predictable representation property with
respect to the filtration G under P˜β,
(ii) there exists an Rd×d-valued, G-adapted process m such that
〈S˜cld〉t =
∫ t
0
mum
∗
u du (3.22)
where mm∗ is invertible and satisfies mm∗ = Sσσ∗S. Here σ is a d-dimensional square matrix of
G-adapted processes, which satisfies the ellipticity condition (3.7).
The following proposition establishes the no-arbitrage property of Bergman’s model under the
present assumptions. Since the proof of this result is very similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2 in
[12], it is omitted.
Proposition 3.6 If Assumption 3.5 holds, then Bergman’s model is arbitrage-free for the hedger
and the counterparty in respect of any initial endowments and any contract (A,C).
For the sake of comparison, we recall Proposition 3.3 from [14] concerning the case of exogenous
collateral.
Proposition 3.7 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumption 3.5 be valid. Then for any contract (A,C)
such that AC ∈ A(P˜β) we have P h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,x1 − C and P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y˜
c,x2 − C where
(Y˜ h,x1 , Z˜h,x1) is the unique solution to the following BSDE{
dY˜
h,x1
t = Z˜
h,x1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t +G
h(t, x1, Y˜
h,x1
t , Z˜
h,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,x1
T = 0,
and (Y˜ c,x2 , Z˜c,x2) is the unique solution to the following BSDE{
dY˜
c,x2
t = Z˜
c,x2,∗
t dS˜
cld
t +G
c(t, x2, Y˜
c,x2
t , Z˜
c,x2
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
c,x2
T = 0,
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where the generators Gh and Gc are given by the following expressions
Gh(t, x1, y, z) :=
d∑
i=1
ziβitS
i
t − x1r
l
tB
l
t + r
l
t
(
y + x1B
l
t − z
∗St
)+
− rbt
(
y + x1B
l
t − z
∗St
)−
and
Gc(t, x2, y, z) :=
d∑
i=1
ziβitS
i
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
l
t
(
− y + x2B
b
t + z
∗St
)+
+ rbt
(
− y + x2B
b
t + z
∗St
)−
.
The next result covers the case of hedger’s collateral when the initial endowments x1 and x2 have
opposite signs. Since its proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.3, it is not presented here.
Proposition 3.8 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜β), the hedger’s ex-dividend price equals P h = Y
1
where (Y
1
, Z
1
) is the unique
solution to the BSDE  dY
1
t = Z
1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + f
(
t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y
1
T = 0,
(3.23)
with the generator f given by
f(t, x1, y, z) =
d∑
i=1
ziβitS
i
t − x1r
l
tB
l
t − r
c
t q(−y)
+ rlt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t − z
∗St
)+
− rbt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t − z
∗St
)−
and the counterparty’s ex-dividend price equals P c = Y
2
where (Y
2
, Z
2
) is the unique solution to
the BSDE  dY
2
t = Z
2,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
(
t, x2, Y
2
t , Z
2
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y
2
T = 0,
(3.24)
with the generator g given by
g(t, x2, y, z) =
d∑
i=1
ziβitS
i
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
c
t q(−Y
1
t )
− rlt
(
− y − q(−Y
1
t ) + x2B
b
t + z
∗St
)+
+ rbt
(
− y − q(−Y
1
t ) + x2B
b
t + z
∗St
)−
.
We are now in a position to analyze the range of fair bilateral prices when the initial endowments
of counterparties are of opposite signs.
Proposition 3.9 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid.
(i) If x1x2 = 0, then for any contract (A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜
β) we have, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s. (3.25)
(ii) Let rl and rb be deterministic and satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then (3.25) holds for all
contracts (A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜β) and all t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if x1x2 = 0.
Proof. (i) We consider solutions (Y
1
, Z
1
) and (Y
2
, Z
2
) to BSDEs (3.23) and (3.24) studied in
Proposition 3.8 and we wish to apply the comparison theorem for BSDEs to show that Y
1
≥ Y
2
.
We claim that if x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ 0, then
δ := g(t, x2, Y
1
t , Z
1
t )− f(t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t ) ≥ max
{
− (rbt − r
l
t)x1B
l
t, (r
b
t − r
l
t)x2B
b
t
}
. (3.26)
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Indeed, we have
δ = x1r
l
tB
l
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
where we denote
δ1 := −Y
1
t − q(−Y
1
t ) + x2B
b
t + Z
1,∗
t St,
δ2 := Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) + x1B
l
t − Z
1,∗
t St.
From the postulated inequality rlt ≤ r
b
t , it follows easily that
δ ≥ x1r
l
tB
l
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
l
t(δ1 + δ2) = (r
b
t − r
l
t)x2B
b
t
and
δ ≥ x1r
l
tB
l
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
b
t (δ1 + δ2) = −(r
b
t − r
l
t)x1B
l
t.
We have thus proven that (3.26) is valid. If x1x2 = 0, then the right-hand side in (3.26) is
non-negative. Hence δ ≥ 0 and thus, from the comparison theorem for BSDEs and the equality
(P h, P c) = (Y
1
, Y
2
) (see Proposition 3.8), we deduce that (3.25) is satisfied for every t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) We now assume that the interest rates rl and rb are deterministic and satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. If x1x2 6= 0, then the example from the proof of Proposition 5.4 in [12] gives a contract
(A,C) with q ≡ 0, such that the inequality P c0 (x2,−A,−C) > P
h
0 (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s., holds in the
present framework, so that the set Rf0 (x1, x2) is empty. 
4 Bergman’s Model with Negotiated Collateral
Our objective in Sections 4 and 6 is to analyze the situation where the collateral amount C relies upon
both the hedger’s value V h := V (x1, ϕ, A,C) and the counterparty’s value V
c := V (x2, ϕ˜,−A,−C).
Specifically, Assumption 3.1 is replaced by the following postulate in which the collateral amount
may depend on the contract’s valuation by both parties. For convenience, we then say that the
collateral is negotiated by the two parties, the sense that both the choice of the collateral convention
q̂ and the dynamic computation of the collateral amount Ct involve both parties of a contract, in
general.
Assumption 4.1 The negotiated collateral C is given by
Ct = q̂
(
V 0t (x1)− V
h
t , V
c
t − V
0
t (x2)
)
(4.1)
where q̂ : R2 → R is a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function such that q̂(0, 0) = 0.
The case of a negotiated collateral should be contrasted with the situation considered in the
preceding section, where it was postulated that the collateral amount was set by one party only.
Let us observe that the prices for both parties will now depend on the vector of initial endowments
(x1, x2), but we will keep writing P
h(x1, A, C) and P
c(x2,−A,−C) instead of P
h(x1, x2, A, C) and
P c(x1, x2,−A,−C), respectively. For x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0, using the arguments from the proof of
Proposition 3.3, we obtain
P h = P h(x1, A, C) = V (x1, ϕ, A,C) − x1B
l = V h − x1B
l
and
P c = P c(x2,−A,−C) = −V (x2, ϕ˜,−A,−C) + x2B
l = −V c + x2B
l.
Similarly, for x2 ≤ 0, we have
P c = P c(x2,−A,−C) = −V (x2, ϕ˜,−A,−C) + x2B
b = −V c + x2B
b.
We conclude that the following equality is valid, for x1 ≥ 0 and an arbitrary x2,
Ct = q̂
(
V 0t (x1)− V
h
t , V
c
t − V
0
t (x2)
)
= q̂(−P ht ,−P
c
t ). (4.2)
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Example 4.1 As a particular instance of equation (4.1), we can consider the convex collateralization
given by q̂(y1, y2) = αy1 + (1− α)y2 for some α ∈ [0, 1], so that
Ct = α(V
0
t (x) − V
h
t ) + (1− α)(V
c
t − V
0
t (x)) = −(αP
h
t + (1− α)P
c
t ).
4.1 Fully-Coupled Pricing BSDE
The following result, which covers the case of non-negative initial endowments, is a rather straight-
forward extension of Proposition 3.3 and thus its proof is omitted. It is worth noting that the
processes Y and Z are R2-valued and Rd×2-valued, respectively.
Proposition 4.1 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.3 and 4.1 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜l), the hedger’s and counterparty’s ex-dividend prices satisfy (P h, P c)∗ = Y where
the pair (Y, Z) solves the following two-dimensional, fully-coupled BSDE{
dYt = Z
∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + g
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
dt+ dAt,
YT = 0,
(4.3)
where g = (g1, g2)∗, A = (A,A)∗ and, for all y = (y1, y2)
∗ ∈ R2, z = (z1, z2) ∈ R
d×2,
g1(t, y, z) = rlt(B
l
t)
−1z∗1St − x1B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
+ rlt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t − (B
l
t)
−1z∗1St
)+
(4.4)
− rbt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t − (B
l
t)
−1z∗1St
)−
and
g2(t, y, z) = rlt(B
l
t)
−1z∗2St + x2B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
− rlt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1z∗2St
)+
(4.5)
+ rbt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1z∗2St
)−
.
Obviously, the prices for both parties depend here on the vector (x1, x2) of initial endowments, so
that the notation P h = P h(x1, x2, A, C) and P
c = P c(x1, x2,−A,−C) would be more appropriate.
However, for brevity, they will still be denoted as P h(x1, A, C) and P
c(x2,−A,−C), respectively.
The case of initial endowments of opposite signs is covered by the following proposition, which
corresponds to Proposition 3.8.
Proposition 4.2 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.5 and 4.1 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜β), the hedger’s and counterparty’s ex-dividend prices satisfy (P h, P c)∗ = Ŷ where
the pair (Ŷ , Ẑ) solves the following two-dimensional fully-coupled BSDE{
dŶt = Ẑ
∗
t dS˜
cld
t + ĝ
(
t, Ŷt, Ẑt
)
dt+ dAt,
ŶT = 0,
(4.6)
where ĝ = (ĝ1, ĝ2)∗, A = (A,A)∗ and, for all y = (y1, y2)
∗ ∈ R2 and z = (z1, z2) ∈ R
d×2,
ĝ1(t, y, z) =
∑d
i=1z
i
1β
i
tS
i
t − x1B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
+ rlt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t − z
∗
1St
)+
(4.7)
− rbt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t − z
∗
1St
)−
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and
ĝ2(t, y, z) =
∑d
i=1z
i
2β
i
tS
i
t + x2B
b
t r
b
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
− rlt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
b
t + z
∗
2St
)+
(4.8)
+ rbt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
b
t + z
∗
2St
)−
.
Proof. Once again, the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.3. We also use Theorem 3.2
in [13] to show the well-posedness of BSDEs (4.3) and (4.6). Although the BSDE studied in [13] is
one-dimensional, it is clear that Theorem 3.2 in [13] can be easily extended to the multi-dimensional
framework. 
4.2 Backward Stochastic Viability Property
To obtain the range of fair bilateral prices in the case of the negotiated collateral, one needs to
compare the two components of a solution to fully-coupled BSDEs (4.3) and (4.6). When these BSDE
are driven by a general continuous martingale, this is a challenging open problem. Fortunately, in
most commonly used financial models, the pricing BSDEs are in fact driven by a Brownian motion.
Under this assumption, using the ideas from Hu and Peng [10] and the characterization for the
backward stochastic viability property (BSVP) given by Buckdahn et al. [4], we will be able to
compare the two one-dimensional components, Y 1 and Y 2, of a unique solution to BSDE (4.3) by
producing first a suitable version of component-wise comparison theorem (see Theorem 4.1 below).
Let us first recall the definition of the backward stochastic viability property (BSVP, for short),
which was studied by Buckdahn et al. [4]. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space endowed with
the filtration F generated by a d-dimensional Brownian motion W . For any Euclidean space H,
we denote L2ad(Ω, C([0, T ],H)) by the closed, linear subspace of F-adapted processes of the space
L2(Ω,F ,P, C([0, T ],H)). Also, let L2ad(Ω × (0, T ),H) be the Hilbert space of F-adapted and mea-
surable processes X such that ‖X‖2 =
(
E
∫ T
0 |Xt|
2 dt
)1/2
< ∞. We now consider the following
n-dimensional BSDE
Yt = η +
∫ T
t
h(s, Ys, Zs) ds−
∫ T
t
Zs dWs (4.9)
where η is an Rn-valued random variable and the generator h satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 4.2 Let the mapping h : Ω× [0, T ]× Rn × Rn×d → Rn satisfy:
(i) P-a.s., for all (y, z) ∈ Rn × Rn×d, the process (h(t, y, z))t∈[0,T ] is F-adapted and the mapping
t→ h(t, y, z) is continuous,
(ii) the function h is uniformly Lipschitzian with respect to (y, z): there exists a constant L ≥ 0
such that P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ] and y, y′ ∈ Rn, z, z′ ∈ Rn×d
|h(t, y, z)− h(t, y′, z′)| ≤ L(|y − y′|+ |z − z′|),
(iii) the random variable sup t∈[0,T ] |h(t, 0, 0)|
2 is square-integrable under P.
The following definition is due to Buckdahn et al. [4].
Definition 4.1 We say that BSDE (4.9) has the backward stochastic viability property (BSVP) in
K if and only if: for any U ∈ [0, T ] and an arbitrary η ∈ L2(Ω,FU ,P;K), the unique solution
(Y, Z) ∈ L2ad(Ω, C([0, U ],R
n)) × L2ad(Ω × (0, U),R
n×d) to the BSDE (4.9) over time interval [0, U ],
that is,
Yt = η +
∫ U
t
h(s, Ys, Zs) ds−
∫ U
t
Zs dWs, (4.10)
satisfies Yt ∈ K for all t ∈ [0, U ], P-a.s.
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For a non-empty, closed, convex set of K ⊂ Rn, let ΠK(y) be the projection of a point y ∈ R
n
onto K and let dK(y) be the distance between y and K. The following result was established by
Buckdahn et al. [4].
Proposition 4.3 Let the generator h satisfy Assumption 4.2. Then BSDE (4.9) has the BSVP in
K if and only if for any t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ Rn×d and y ∈ Rn such that d2K(·) is twice differentiable at y,
we have
4〈y −ΠK(y), h(t,ΠK(y), z)〉 ≤ 〈D
2d2K(y)z, z〉+Md
2
K(y) (4.11)
where M > 0 is a constant independent of (t, y, z).
Motivated by results from Hu and Peng [10], we will show that Proposition 4.3 can be used to
establish a convenient version of component-wise comparison theorem for the two-dimensional BSDE.
Specifically, we prove the following theorem, in which we denote Y = (Y 1, Y 2)∗, Z = (Z1, Z2)∗ and
h(t, y, z) =
(
h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2), h2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2)
)∗
.
Theorem 4.1 Consider the two-dimensional BSDE
Yt = η +
∫ T
t
h(s, Ys, Zs) ds−
∫ T
t
Zs dWs (4.12)
driven by the d-dimensional Brownian motion W , where the generator h = (h1, h2)∗ satisfies As-
sumption 4.2. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) for any U ∈ [0, T ] and η1, η2 ∈ L2(Ω,FU ,P,R) such that η
1 ≥ η2, the unique solution (Y, Z) ∈
L2ad(Ω, C([0, U ],R
2))×L2ad(Ω× (0, U),R
2×d) to (4.12) on [0, U ] satisfies Y 1t ≥ Y
2
t for all t ∈ [0, U ],
(ii) the following inequality holds, for all y1, y2 ∈ R and z1, z2 ∈ R
d,
−4y−1 [h
1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)]
≤M |y−1 |
2 + 2|z1|
2
1{y1<0}, P− a.s.
(4.13)
Proof. Let us denote Y˜ = (Y 1 − Y 2, Y 2)∗, Z˜ = (Z1 − Z2, Z2)∗, η˜ = (η1 − η2, η2)∗ and h˜(t, y, z) =
(h˜1(t, y, z), h˜2(t, y, z))∗ where
h˜1(t, y, z) := h1(t, y1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)
and
h˜2(t, y, z) := h2(t, y1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2).
Then statement (i) is equivalent to the following condition:
(iii) for any date U ∈ [0, T ] and an arbitrary η˜ = (η˜1, η˜2) such that η˜1 ≥ 0, the unique solution
(Y˜ , Z˜) to the following BSDE over time interval [0, U ]
Y˜t = η˜ +
∫ U
t
h˜(s, Y˜s, Z˜s) ds−
∫ U
t
Z˜s dWs (4.14)
satisfies Y˜ 1 ≥ 0. By applying Proposition 4.3 to BSDE (4.14) and the convex, closed setK = R+×R,
we see that (iii) is in turn equivalent to (ii), since (4.11) coincides with (4.13) in that case. 
4.3 Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we work under Assumption 3.4, so that we deal with a diffusion model.
For simplicity, we present here the case of one risky asset driven by the one-dimensional Brownian
motion W but, in view of Theorem 4.1, an extension to the case of d risky assets driven by a d-
dimensional Brownian motion is rather straightforward. Let us recall that the process a is given by
equation (3.15).
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Assumption 4.3 We postulate that the process a satisfies Novikov’s condition (3.16), the pro-
cess (σ(·, S))−1 and all the interest rates are continuous processes, and the process (σ(·, S))−1S is
bounded.
Since
dS˜
l,cld
t =
(
µ(t, St) + κ(t, St)− r
l
tSt
)
dt+ σ(t, St) dWt = σ(t, St)(at dt+ dWt),
the pricing BSDE (4.3) reduces to{
dYt = Ztσ(t, St) dWt +
(
g(t, Yt, Zt) + σ(t, St)atZt
)
dt+ dAt,
YT = 0,
or, equivalently, {
dYt = Zt dWt +
(
g
(
t, Yt, (σ(t, St))
−1Zt
)
+ atZt
)
dt+ dAt,
YT = 0.
(4.15)
We first focus on the valuation and hedging of the collateralized European contingent claim (HT , C)
given by (3.18). Then (4.15) is equivalent to the following BSDE, for t ∈ [0, T ),
Yt =
(
−HT
−HT
)
−
∫ T
t
Zs dWs −
∫ T
t
(
g(s, Ys, (σ(s, Ss))
−1Zs) + asZs
)
ds
with an additional jump at terminal date T , which ensures that YT = 0. It is thus clear that it
suffices to examine the following BSDE on [0, T ]{
dYt = Zt dW˜
l
t + g
(
t, Yt, (σ(t, St))
−1Zt
)
dt,
YT = (−HT ,−HT )
∗,
(4.16)
where W˜ l is a Brownian motion under the probability measure P˜l defined by (3.17). We are now in
a position to study the range of fair bilateral prices at time t for the European claim with negotiated
collateral. Recall that in the present framework we have that P h(x1, A, C) = P
h(x1, x2, A, C) and
P c(x2,−A,−C) = P
c(x1, x2,−A,−C).
Proposition 4.4 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3 be valid. Consider an
arbitrary collateralized European claim (HT , C) where HT ∈ L
2(Ω,FT , P˜
l). Then we have, for every
t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−HT ,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, HT , C), P˜
l − a.s. (4.17)
Proof. We write σ−1 := (σ(t, St))
−1. It is sufficient to check that the functions h1 and h2, which
are given by
h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −g
1
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1z1, σ
−1z2
)
and
h2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −g
2
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1z1, σ
−1z2
)
,
where g1 and g2 are given by (4.4) and (4.5) with d = 1, respectively, satisfy Assumption 4.2 under
P˜l and condition (4.13). First, using the continuity of (σ(·, S))−1, g1 and g2 with respect to t,
we know that for y1, y2, z1, z2 ∈ R, the function h
1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) and h
2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) are also
continuous with respect to t. Second, since the process (σ(·, S))−1S is bounded and the function
q̂ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, it is obvious that h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) and h
2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) are
uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to (y1, y2, z1, z2). Moreover, from q̂(0, 0) = 0 and
x1, x2 ≥ 0, we obtain
h1(t, 0, 0, 0, 0) = h2(t, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
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We conclude that Assumption 4.2 holds for h1 and h2. Let us check condition (4.13) is valid as well.
If we set
δ1 := y
+
1 + y2 + q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2) + x1B
l
t − (B
l
t)
−1σ−1(z1 + z2)St
and
δ2 := −y2 − q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1σ−1z2St,
then
h1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)
= −g1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, σ
−1(z1 + z2), σ
−1z2) + g
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, σ
−1(z1 + z2), σ
−1z2)
= −rlt(B
l
t)
−1σ−1z1St + (x1 + x2)B
l
tr
l
t − r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ).
Since rlt ≤ r
b
t , we have
rlt(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ) ≤ r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
l
t(δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ) = r
l
t(δ1 + δ2)
= rlty
+
1 + (x1 + x2)B
l
tr
l
t − r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1σ−1z1St
and
h1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)
= −rlt(B
l
t)
−1σ−1z1St + (x1 + x2)B
l
tr
l
t − r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ) ≥ −r
l
ty
+
1 .
Consequently, we obtain
−4y−1 [h
1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)]
≤ 4rlty
−
1 y
+
1 = 0 ≤M |y
−
1 |
2 + 2z211{y1<0},
which is the desired condition (4.13). 
Let us now consider a more general contractA where the hedger receives cash flowsH1, H2, . . . , Hk
at times 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tk ≤ T , so that
At −A0 =
k∑
l=1
1[tl,T ](t)Hl
where Hl ∈ L
2(Ω,Ftl , P˜
l). For conciseness, we denote this claim as (H,C).
Proposition 4.5 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3 be valid. Then for any
collateralized claim (H,C) where Hl ∈ L
2(Ω,Ftl , P˜
l) for l = 1, 2, . . . , k we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−H,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, H,C), P˜
l − a.s.
Proof. We first study the problem on [tk, T ]. Since dAt = 0, it is just a special case of Proposition
4.4 (it suffices to take HT = 0), we have that P
c
t ≤ P
h
t for all t ∈ [tk, T ]. Indeed, one can check
directly that the equalities P ct = P
h
t = 0 hold for all t ∈ [tk, T ].
We now consider the problem on [tk−1, tk). Recall that (P
h, P c)∗ = Y = (Y1, Y2)
∗ where (Y, Z)
solves BSDE (4.15). From the first step, we know that Y1,tk = Y2,tk = 0. Let us consider BSDE (4.15)
on [tk−1, tk]. Noticing that A only changes at time tk and ∆Atk = Hk, we obtain, for s ∈ [tk−1, tk),
Ys =
(
−Hk
−Hk
)
−
∫ tk
s
Zt dW˜
l
t −
∫ tk
s
g
(
t, Yt, σ
−1
t Zt
)
dt
where σ−1t := (σ(t, St))
−1. So this is nothing else than just the pricing BSDE for European claim
with maturity tk and with receiving payoff Hk. Therefore, using Proposition 4.4, we have that for
all t ∈ [tk−1, tk), Y2,t ≤ Y1,t which yields P
c
t ≤ P
h
t .
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We can extend this inequality to [tk−2, tk−1). Indeed, for s ∈ [tk−2, tk−1),
Ys =
(
Y1,tk−1 −Hk−1
Y2,tk−1 −Hk−1
)
−
∫ tk−1
s
Zt dW˜
l
t −
∫ tk−1
s
g
(
t, Yt, σ
−1
t Zt
)
dt.
Since from the second step, we know Y2,tk−1 ≤ Y1,tk−1 , using Theorem 4.1 and the proof of Propo-
sition 4.4, we obtain Y2,t ≤ Y1,t for all t ∈ [tk−2, tk−1), which in turn yields P
c
t ≤ P
h
t for all
t ∈ [tk−2, tk−1). By the backward induction, we conclude that (4.17) holds for every t ∈ [0, T ]. 
We also have the following result for the counterparty’s price.
Proposition 4.6 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3 be valid. Consider an
arbitrary contract (A,C) where A−A0 is a non-positive (or bounded from above, so that A−A0 ≤M
for some constant M), continuous, G-adapted process such that E
P˜l
[supt∈[0,T ] |At|
2] <∞. Then we
have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
l − a.s.
Proof. Recall that σ−1t := (σ(t, St))
−1. We have (P h, P c)∗ = Y = (Y1, Y2)
∗ where (Y, Z) solves
BSDE (4.15). Let Y˜ := Y −A+A0, where A = (A,A)
∗ and A0 = (A0, A0)
∗, so that{
dY˜t = Zt dW˜
l
t + g
(
t, Y˜t +At −A0, σ
−1
t Zt
)
dt,
Y˜T = −AT .
Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 4.4, we let
h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −g
1(t, y1 +At −A0, y2 +At −A0, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2)
and
h2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −g
2(t, y1 +At −A0, y2 +At −A0, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2).
Since A is continuous and E
P˜l
[supt∈[0,T ] |At|
2] < ∞, it is not hard to check that Assumption 4.2 is
satisfied by h1 and h2. Moreover, since A−A0 ≤ 0 (or A−A0 ≤M), we have
−4y−1 [h
1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)]
≤ 4rlty
−
1 (y
+
1 +At −A0) ≤ |M ||y
−
1 |
2 + 2z211{y1<0}.
To complete the proof, it suffices to use Theorem 4.1. 
Remark 4.1 For a contract (A,C) with a more general process A, we may not have similar results.
This is because that in (4.15), a general cash flow A may destroy the viability property. However, by
mixing the two kinds of special contracts introduced in Propositions 4.5 and 4.6, we can construct
the following class of contracts: for 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tk ≤ T , and processes Hl(t), l = 1, . . . , k
defined on [tl, T ],
At −A0 =
k∑
l=1
1[tl,T ](t)Hl(t)
where, for l = 1, 2, . . . , k, the process Hl(t), t ∈ [tl, T ], satisfies one of the following conditions:
(i) Hl is a continuous, G-adapted process, Hl ≤M and EP˜l [supt∈[tl,T ] |Hl(t)|
2] <∞,
(ii) Hl(t) = Hl for all t ∈ [tl, T ], where the random variable Hl ∈ L
2(Ω,Ftl ,P).
By combining the statements and proofs of Propositions 4.5 and 4.6, one can show that the range
of fair bilateral pricesRft (x1, x2) for the contract (A,C) satisfying (i)–(ii) is non-empty almost surely.
20 T. Nie and M. Rutkowski
4.4 Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
We only consider here the case of a collateralized European contingent claim (HT , C), but similar
results hold for two special kinds of contracts introduced in Propositions 4.5 and 4.6. We work under
Assumptions 3.4 and 3.5 and we denote
bt := (σ(t, St))
−1
(
µ(t, St) + κ(t, St)− βtSt
)
. (4.18)
Assumption 4.4 We postulate that the process b satisfies Novikov’s condition (3.16), the processes
(σ(·, S))−1, β and all interest rates are continuous processes and the process (σ(·, S))−1S is bounded.
We observe that
dS˜cldt =
(
µ(t, St) + κ(t, St)− βtSt
)
dt+ σ(t, St) dWt = σ(t, St)
(
bt dt+ dWt
)
= σ(t, St) dW˜
β
t
where dW˜ βt := dWt + bt dt. Let us define the probability measure P˜
β by setting
dP˜β
dP
= exp
{
−
∫ T
0
bt dWt −
1
2
∫ T
0
|bt|
2 dt
}
.
From the Girsanov theorem, the process W˜ β is the Brownian motion under P˜β and thus S˜cld is a
(P˜β ,G)-(local) martingale with the quadratic variation 〈S˜cld〉t =
∫ t
0 |σ(u, Su)|
2 du. Moreover, since
the process (σ(·, S))−1S is bounded, Assumption 3.5 holds. We conclude that the model is arbitrage
free under P˜β (see Proposition 3.6).
Under the present framework, BSDE (4.6) can be represented as follows{
dYt = Ztσ(t, St) dWt +
(
ĝ
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
+ σ(t, St)btZt
)
dt+ dAt,
YT = 0.
As in Section 4.3, it is thus sufficient to examine the following BSDE on [0, T ]{
dYt = Zt dW˜
β
t + ĝ
(
t, Yt, (σ(t, St))
−1Zt
)
dt,
YT = (−HT ,−HT )
∗.
Proposition 4.7 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 be such that x1x2 = 0. If Assumptions 3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 4.4
are satisfied, then for any collateralized European claim (HT , C) such that HT ∈ L
2(Ω,FT , P˜
β) we
have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−HT ,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, HT , C), P˜
β − a.s.
Proof. Let σ−1t := (σ(t, St))
−1. It suffices to check that the functions
h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −ĝ
1
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2
)
and
h2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −ĝ
2
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2
)
satisfy Assumption 4.2 and condition (4.13), where ĝ1 and ĝ2 are given by (4.7) and (4.8) with
d = 1, respectively. First, from the continuity of β, σ−1, ĝ1 and ĝ2 with respect to t, we deduce
that for y1, y2, z1, z2 ∈ R, the functions h
1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) and h
2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) are also continuous
with respect to t. Second, since σ−1S is bounded and q̂ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, it is
clear that h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) and h
2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) are uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect
to (y1, y2, z1, z2). Moreover, from q̂(0, 0) = 0 and x1 ≥ 0, and x2 ≤ 0, we have that h
1(t, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
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h2(t, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0. We thus see that Assumption 4.2 holds for h1 and h2. Finally, let us check that
condition (4.13) is met as well. To this end, we set
δ1 := y
+
1 + y2 + q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2) + x1B
l
t − σ
−1
t (z1 + z2)St
and
δ2 := −y2 − q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2) + x2B
b
t + σ
−1
t z2St.
Then
h1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)
= −ĝ1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, σ
−1
t (z1 + z2), σ
−1
t z2) + ĝ
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, σ
−1
t (z1 + z2), σ
−1
t z2)
= −σ−1t βt(z1 + z2)St + x1B
l
tr
l
t + r
c
t q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2)− r
l
tδ
+
1 + r
b
tδ
−
1
+ σ−1t βtz2St + x2B
b
t r
b
t − r
c
t q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2)− r
l
tδ
+
2 + r
b
tδ
−
2
= −σ−1t βtz1St + x1B
l
tr
l
t + x2B
b
t r
b
t − r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ).
Since rlt ≤ r
b
t , we have
rlt(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ) ≤ min
{
rlt(δ1 + δ2), r
b
t (δ1 + δ2)
}
= min
{
rlty
+
1 + x1B
l
tr
l
t + x2B
b
t r
l
t − r
l
tσ
−1
t z1St, r
b
ty
+
1 + x1B
l
tr
b
t + x2B
b
t r
b
t − r
b
tσ
−1
t z1St
}
.
Thus
h1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2) ≥ −σ
−1
t βtz1St
+max
{
−rlty
+
1 + x2B
b
t r
b
t − x2B
b
t r
l
t + r
l
tσ
−1
t z1St, −r
b
ty
+
1 + x1B
l
tr
l
t − x1B
l
tr
b
t + r
b
tσ
−1
t z1St
}
.
We also have that
h1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)
≥ −rlty
+
1 + σ
−1
t St(r
l
t − βt)z1 + x2B
b
t (r
b
t − r
l
t).
Consequently, if x2 = 0 then, using the boundedness of processes β, r
l and σ−1S, we obtain
−4y−1 [h
1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)]
≤ 4rlty
−
1 y
+
1 − 4y
−
1 z1σ
−1
t St(r
l
t − βt) = −4y
−
1 z1σ
−1
t St(r
l
t − βt)
≤M |y−1 |
2 + 2z211{y1<0},
which is the desired inequality (4.13). The same inequality can be obtained when x1 = 0. 
Remark 4.2 Let us consider a more general class of contracts considered in Section 4.3. We now
assume that the interest rates rl and rb are deterministic and satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Using
the example studied in the proof of Proposition 5.4 in [12], for every model for risky assets we see
that for every contract (A,C) considered in Section 4.3, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s.
if and only if x1x2 = 0.
Remark 4.3 As was explained in Section 3.1, the price P h(x1, A, C) (resp., P
c(x2,−A−, C)) in-
deed should be P h(x1, x2, A, C) (resp., P
c(x1, x2,−A,−C)), meaning that the hedger’s and the
counterparty’s price depend on both initial endowments x1 and x2. Using the comparison theorem
for multi-dimensional BSDE (see Hu and Peng [10]), one may attempt to show the monotonicity of
prices with respect to the initial endowment (for related results, see Section 5.4 in [12]).
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5 Model with Partial Netting and Hedger’s Collateral
In Sections 5 and 6, we consider the model with partial netting and full rehypothecation of the
cash collateral. For a detailed description of this modeling framework, the reader is referred to
[2, 12]. Our aim is to show that the methodology developed in preceding sections can be applied
to this setup, albeit with possibly different conclusions regarding the properties of unilateral and
bilateral prices. Since the proofs of some results are very similar to the proofs of their counterparts
in Bergman’s model, they are omitted.
From Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 of [12], we know that for a self-financing trading strategy
ϕ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd, ϕl, ϕb, ϕ1,b, ϕ2,b, . . . , ϕd,b, η),
the processes Y l := (Bl)−1V p(x, ϕ,A,C) and Z l,i = ξi, i = 1, 2, . . . , d satisfy
dY lt =
d∑
i=1
Z
l,i
t dS˜
i,l,cld
t +Gl(t, Y
l
t , Z
l
t) dt+ dA
C,l
t (5.1)
where the generator Gl equals, for all (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× R× R
d,
Gl(t, y, z) = (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1 r
l
tz
iSit − (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ − rlty
+(Blt)
−1
(
rlt
(
yBlt +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
yBlt +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)−)
.
Similarly, the processes Y b := (Bb)−1V p(x, ϕ,A,C) and Zb,i = ξi, i = 1, 2, . . . , d satisfy
dY bt =
d∑
i=1
Z
b,i
t dS˜
i,b,cld
t +Gb(t, Y
b
t , Z
b
t ) dt+ dA
C,b
t (5.2)
where, for all (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× R× Rd,
Gb(t, y, z) = (B
b
t )
−1
∑d
i=1 r
b
tz
iSit − (B
b
t )
−1
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ − rbty
+(Bbt )
−1
(
rlt
(
yBbt +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
yBbt +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)−)
.
Throughout Section 5, we work under Assumption 3.1 of hedger’s collateral.
5.1 Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
We first examine the case where the initial endowments satisfy x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0. We notice that
in such case, under Assumption 3.2 (or Assumption 3.3) the partial netting model is arbitrage-free
with respect to any contract (A,C) for the hedger and the counterparty (see Proposition 3.1 in [12]).
Using Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 in [12], we can establish the following proposition, which corresponds
to Proposition 3.3 in the present work.
Proposition 5.1 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜l), the hedger’s ex-dividend price equals P h := P h(x1, A, C) = Y
1 where (Y 1, Z1)
is the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY 1t = Z
1,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + fl
(
t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y 1T = 0,
(5.3)
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with the generator fl given by
fl(t, x1, y, z) = r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1z∗St − (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ − x1B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q(−y)
+ rlt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)− (5.4)
and the counterparty’s ex-dividend price equals P c := P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y
2 where (Y 2, Z2) is the
unique solution to the BSDE{
dY 2t = Z
2,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + gl
(
t, x2, Y
2
t , Z
2
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y 2T = 0,
(5.5)
with the generator gl given by
gl(t, x2, y, z) = r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1z∗St + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (−z
iSit)
+ + x2B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
tq(−Y
1
t )
− rlt
(
− y − q(−Y 1t ) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(−z
iSit)
−
)+
+ rbt
(
− y − q(−Y 1t ) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(−z
iSit)
−
)−
.
(5.6)
As in Bergman’s model, if the convention of hedger’s collateral is postulated, then we have
P h = P h(x1, A, C) and P
c = P c(x1, x2,−A,−C), but we still denote the counterparty’s price as
P c(x2,−A,−C). We are in a position to study the range of fair bilateral prices.
Proposition 5.2 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 be valid. Then for any contract
(A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜l) we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
l − a.s. (5.7)
Proof. It is enough to show that gl(t, x2, Y
1, Z1) ≥ fl(t, x1, Y
1, Z1), P˜l ⊗ ℓ − a.e.. We denote
δ := gl(t, x2, Y
1, Z1)− fl(t, x1, Y
1, Z1)
= rltB
l
t(x1 + x2) + (B
l
t)
−1
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t |Z
1,i
t S
i
t | − r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
where
δ1 := −Y
1
t − q(−Y
1
t ) +B
l
tx2 + (B
l
t)
−1
d∑
i=1
(−Z1,it S
i
t)
−
and
δ2 := Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) +B
l
tx1 + (B
l
t)
−1
d∑
i=1
(Z1,it S
i
t)
−.
Since rl ≤ rb and rl ≤ ri,b, we obtain
δ ≥ rltB
l
t(x1 + x2) + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t |Z
1,i
t S
i
t | − r
l
t(δ1 + δ2)
≥ (Blt)
−1
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
l)|Z1,it S
i
t | ≥ 0,
which completes the proof. 
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5.1.1 Model with an Uncertain Money Market Rate
We study here the case of initial endowments satisfying x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0, but results for the case
where x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ 0 are similar. Let us select an arbitrary G-adapted interest rate process
satisfying
rt ∈ [r
l
t, r
b
t ] for every t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.8)
We now consider the market model with the single money market rate r in which the hedger and
counterparty have the same ex-dividend price P r independent of their respective initial endowments.
The price P r = Y can be found by solving the BSDE{
dYt = Z
∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + f(t, Yt, Zt) dt+ dAt,
YT = 0,
(5.9)
where the generator f equals
f(t, y, z) = rlt(B
l
t)
−1z∗St−(B
l
t)
−1∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+−(Blt)
−1
∑d
i=1rt(z
iSit)
−−rctq(−y)+rt
(
y+q(−y)
)
.
Similarly to Proposition 3.5, we have the following result under Assumption 3.1.
Proposition 5.3 For any contract (A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜l), the unique no-arbitrage price in the
market model with the money market rate r satisfies P r ≤ P h(0, A, C), P˜l − a.s. If x1 = x2 = 0 and
in addition, the function q in (3.5) satisfies (rt − r
c
t )(q(y1) − q(y2)) ≤ 0 for all y1 ≥ y2, then also
P c(0,−A,−C) ≤ P r, P˜l − a.s.
5.2 Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
Let us now consider the case where x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. We now postulate that r
b ≤ ri,b and
Assumption 3.5 holds with rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b. From Proposition 3.2 in [12], we know that the partial
netting model is arbitrage-free for both the hedger and the counterparty in respect of any contract
(A,C) and arbitrary initial endowments. Using Proposition 5.3 in [12] and argument similar as in
the proof of Proposition 3.8, one can prove the following propositions.
Proposition 5.4 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜β), the hedger’s ex-dividend price equals P h = Y
1
where the pair (Y
1
, Z
1
) is the
unique solution to the BSDE dY
1
t = Z
1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + f
(
t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y
1
T = 0,
(5.10)
where
f(t, x1, y, z) =
∑d
i=1 z
iβitS
i
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ − x1r
l
tB
l
t − r
c
t q(−y)
+ rlt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y + q(−y) + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)−
and the counterparty’s ex-dividend price equals P c = Y
c
where the pair (Y
c
, Z
c
) is the unique
solution to the BSDE  dY
2
t = Z
2,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
(
t, x2, Y
2
t , Z
2
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y
2
T = 0,
(5.11)
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where
g(t, x2, y, z) =
∑d
i=1 z
iβitS
i
t +
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (−z
iSit)
+ + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
c
tq(−Y
1
t )
− rlt
(
− y − q(−Y
1
t ) + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(−z
iSit)
−
)+
+ rbt
(
− y − q(−Y
1
t ) + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(−z
iSit)
−
)−
.
The following result shows that the range of fair bilateral prices is non-empty provided that
x1x2 = 0. Otherwise, one can produce an example of a model in which this range is empty.
Proposition 5.5 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid.
(i) If x1x2 = 0, then for any contract (A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜
β) we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ]
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s. (5.12)
(ii) Let rl and rb be deterministic and satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then (5.12) holds for all
contracts (A,C) such that A ∈ A(P˜β) and all t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if x1x2 = 0.
Proof. (i) Assume that x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. We will show that
δ := g(t, x2, Y
1
, Z
1
)− f(t, x1, Y
1
, Z
1
)
≥ max
{
− (rbt − r
l
t)x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
b
t )|Z
1,i
t S
i
t |, (r
b
t − r
l
t)x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
l
t)|Z
1,i
t S
i
t |
}
.
Indeed, we have
δ = x1r
l
tB
l
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
where
δ1 := −Y
1
t − q(−Y
1
t ) + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(−Z
1,i
t S
i
t)
−, δ2 := Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(Z
1,i
t S
i
t)
−.
From rlt ≤ r
b
t , it follows that
δ ≥
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t |z
iSit |+ x1r
l
tB
l
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
l
t(δ1 + δ2) = (r
b
t − r
l
t)x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
l
t)|Z
1,i
t S
i
t |
and
δ ≥
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t |z
iSit |+ x1r
l
tB
l
t + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
b
t (δ1 + δ2) = −(r
b
t − r
l
t)x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
b
t )|Z
1,i
t S
i
t |.
We have thus shown that
δ ≥ max
{
− (rbt − r
l
t)x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
b
t )|Z
1,i
t S
i
t |, (r
b
t − r
l
t)x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
l
t)|Z
1,i
t S
i
t |
}
.
If x1x2 = 0, then using r
i,b
t ≥ r
b
t ≥ r
l
t, it is easy to check that the right-hand side of the above
inequality is non-negative. Hence δ ≥ 0 and thus, from the comparison theorem for BSDEs and
Proposition 3.8, we deduce that inequality (5.12) holds for every t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) If x1x2 6= 0, then the example from the proof of Proposition 5.4 in [12] gives a contract (A,C)
with q ≡ 0, such that the inequality
P c0 (x2,−A,−C) > P
h
0 (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s.
holds in the present framework, so that Rp0(x1, x2) is non-empty almost surely. 
Remark 5.1 If x1x2 < 0 then, from the above proposition, we know that for some contracts (A,C),
we have P c
t̂
(x2,−A,−C) > P
h
t̂
(x1, A, C) for some t̂ ∈ [0, T ]. As in [12], for some special contracts
of (A,C), the inequality P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C) holds for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We will discuss in
next subsection.
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5.2.1 Contracts with Monotone Cash Flows
We continue the study of the case where x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. Motivated by [12], we will show that
for some special contracts (A,C), inequality (5.12) holds for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Assumption 5.1 The following conditions are satisfied by a contract (A,C):
(i) the process A−A0 is decreasing and belongs to the class A(P˜
β),
(ii) the collateral C is given by (3.5) with the function q satisfying y + q(−y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0.
Condition (ii) holds, for instance, when q(y) = (1+α1)y
+−(1+α2)y
− for some haircut processes
α1, α2 such that α2 ≤ 0 which means that when the hedger posts collateral then the cash amount
never exceeds the full collateral. Indeed, q is obviously uniformly Lipschitz continuous and q(0) = 0.
Moreover, we have, for all y ≥ 0,
y + q(−y) = y − (1 + α2)y = −α2y ≥ 0.
To emphasize the important role of the function q, we will sometimes write P ht (x1, A, q) and
P ct (x1,−A,−q) instead of P
h
t (x1, A, C) and P
c
t (x2,−A,−C), respectively.
Remark 5.2 In the case of Bergman’s model, we were unable to prove that the range of fair bilateral
prices is non-empty using the method employed to establish the next result. This shows once again
that the properties of prices depend on specific features of a market model at hand.
Proposition 5.6 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid. If a contract (A,C)
satisfies Assumption 5.1, then the inequality P ct (x2,−A,−q) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, q) holds for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. We already know that the pair (P ht , Z˜
h,x1
t ) solves BSDE (5.10), whereas the pair (P
c
t , Z˜
c,x2
t )
solves BSDE (5.11). Noticing that f(t, x1, 0, 0) = 0 and A − A0 is a decreasing process, from the
comparison theorem for BSDEs, we obtain P h = Y
1
≥ 0. Therefore, from x1 ≥ 0 and
y + q(−y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0,
we get
f(t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t ) =
∑d
i=1 Z
i
tβ
i
tS
i
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (Z
i
tS
i
t)
+ − x1r
l
tB
l
t − r
c
tq(−Y
1
t )
+ rlt
(
Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(Z
i
tS
i
t)
−
)
=
∑d
i=1 Z
i
tβ
i
tS
i
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (Z
i
tS
i
t)
+ − rct q(−Y
1
t )
+ rlt
(
Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) +
∑d
i=1(Z
i
tS
i
t)
−
)
.
Since
g(t, x2, y, z) ≥
∑d
i=1 z
iβitS
i
t +
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (−z
iSit)
+ + x2r
b
tB
b
t − r
c
tq(−Y
1
t )
− rbt
(
− y − q(−Y
1
t ) + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(−z
iSit)
−
)
=
∑d
i=1 z
iβitS
i
t +
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (−z
iSit)
+ − rctq(−Y
1
t )
− rbt
(
− y − q(−Y
1
t ) +
∑d
i=1(−z
iSit)
−
)
,
we have that
g(t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t )− f(t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t )
≥
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t |Z
i
tS
i
t |+ (r
b
t − r
l
t)
(
Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t )
)
− rlt
∑d
i=1(Z
i
tS
i
t)
− − rbt
∑d
i=1(−Z
i
tS
i
t)
−
= (rbt − r
l
t)
(
Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t )
)
+
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
l
t)(Z
i
tS
i
t)
− +
∑d
i=1(r
i,b
t − r
b
t )(−Z
i
tS
i
t)
−.
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In view of the inequalities ri,b ≥ rb ≥ rl, Y
1
≥ 0 and y + q(−y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0, we conclude that
g(t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t )− f(t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t ) ≥ 0
and thus the comparison theorem for BSDEs yields the desired inequality. 
5.3 Price Independence of the Hedger’s Initial Endowment
Our next goal is to demonstrate that for a certain class of contracts the hedger’s price in the model
with partial netting is independent of the initial endowment x1. The financial interpretation of
Proposition 5.7 is that the hedger will never need to borrow cash from the account Bb for hedging
purposes and thus the actual level of his non-negative initial endowment is immaterial for his pricing
problem. It is thus clear that a similar result will not hold when x1 ≤ 0. By the same token, the
independence property will not hold in Bergman’s model, in general, since in the latter model the
funding of positive positions in risky assets may require borrowing from the cash account Bb.
Proposition 5.7 Let x1 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid. If a contract (A,C) satisfies
Assumption 5.1, then the hedger’s price P ht (x1, A, q) is independent of x1.
Proof. From Proposition 5.4, we have P h(x1, A, q) = Y
1
where (Y
1
, Z
1
) is the unique solution to
the BSDE  dY
1
t = Z
1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + f
(
t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y
1
T = 0.
Since f(t, x1, 0, 0) = 0 and At−A0 is a decreasing process, from the comparison theorem for BSDEs,
we obtain Y
1
≥ 0. Therefore, using the inequalities x1 ≥ 0 and y + q(−y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0, we get
f(t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t ) =
∑d
i=1 Z
i
tβ
i
tS
i
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (Z
i
tS
i
t)
+ − x1r
l
tB
l
t − r
c
tq(−Y
1
t )
+ rlt
(
Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(Z
i
tS
i
t)
−
)
=
∑d
i=1 Z
i
tβ
i
tS
i
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (Z
i
tS
i
t)
+ − rct q(−Y
1
t )
+ rlt
(
Y
1
t + q(−Y
1
t ) +
∑d
i=1(Z
i
tS
i
t)
−
)
where the last expression is independent of x1. Consequently, the price P
h
t (x1, A, q) = Y
1
t is also
independent of x1. 
Remark 5.3 Suppose that x2 ≥ 0 and a contract (A,C) is such that the process A−A0 is increasing
and belongs to A(P˜β). If the collateral C, as seen from the perspective of the hedger, is given by
Ct = q(V
c
t −V
0
t (x2)) where the function q satisfies−y+q(y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0, then the counterparty’s
price P ct (x2,−A,−q) is independent of x2.
However, if we still work under the assumption of the hedger’s collateral, the problem requires
more attention, since the counterparty’s price depends also on the hedger’s initial endowment x1.
As shown in above proposition, for a contract (A,C) satisfying Assumption 5.1, the process Y
1
is
independent of x1 so that, obviously, the price P
c
t (x2,−A,−q) is independent of x1, but it still may
depend on x2. It is not clear at this moment whether one can find some class of non-trivial contracts
(A,C) with the hedger’s collateral C given by (3.5) such that P ct (x2,−A,−q) does not depend on
x2 (it may still depend on x1).
5.4 Positive Homogeneity of the Hedger’s Price
We consider once again the hedger’s price and we show that it is positively homogeneous with respect
to the size of the contract and the non-negative initial endowment. Observe that this property is
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no longer true if only the size of the contract, but not the level of the hedger’s initial endowment,
is inflated (or deflated) through a non-negative scaling factor λ. Of course, this comment does not
apply when the price of a contract is known to be independent of the hedger’s initial endowment as
is the case, for instance, under the assumptions of Proposition 5.7.
Proposition 5.8 Let x1 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid. For any contract (A,C) such
that A − A0 ∈ A(P˜
β) and the function q in equation (3.5) is positively homogeneous, meaning that
q(λy) = λq(y) for all λ ≥ 0, then the hedger’s price is positively homogeneous as well, specifically,
for all λ ∈ R+ and t ∈ [0, T ],
P ht (λx1, λA, q) = λP
h
t (x1, A, q), P˜
β − a.s. (5.13)
Proof. It is obvious that (5.13) holds for λ = 0. Now we suppose that λ > 0. From Proposition
5.4, we know that P h(x1, A, q) = Y
1
where (Y
1
, Z
1
) is the unique solution to the BSDE dY
1
t = Z
1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + f
(
t, x1, Y
1
t , Z
1
t
)
dt+ dAt,
Y
1
T = 0.
Similarly, P h(λx1, λA, q) = Y˜
1 where (Y˜ 1, Z˜1) is the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY˜ 1t = Z˜
1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + f
(
t, λx1, Y˜
1
t , Z˜
1
t
)
dt+ λdAt,
Y˜ 1T = 0.
Hence for Y := λY
1
and Z = λZ
1
we have{
dY t = Z
∗
t dS˜
cld
t + λf
(
t, x1, λ
−1Y t, λ
−1Zt
)
dt+ λdAt,
Y T = 0.
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that for every λ ∈ R+
λf
(
t, x1, λ
−1y, λ−1z
)
= f
(
t, λx1, y, z
)
.
This can be checked easily using the property q(λy) = λq(y) for every λ ∈ R+. 
If the collateral is given by Ct = q(V
c
t − V
0
t (x2)), then the counterparty’s price has the similar
positive homogeneity property as in Proposition 5.8. However, if the hedger’s collateral is postulated,
the study of the homogeneity property of the counterparty’s price is slightly more complex, since
the counterparty’s price depends, in particular, on the hedger’s initial endowment x1. In that case
Ct = q(V
0
t (x1)− V
h
t ), which depends on (x1, A), so we shall write Ct = C
x1,A
t .
Proposition 5.9 Let x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid. For any contract (A,C) such
that A−A0 ∈ A(P˜
β) and the function q in equation (3.5) is positively homogeneous we have, for all
λ ∈ R+ and t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (λx2,−λA,C
λx1,λA) = λP ct (x2,−A,C
x1,A), P˜β − a.s.
Proof. Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 5.8, it is now sufficient to show that
λg
(
t, x2, λ
−1y, λ−1z
)
= g
(
t, λx2, y, z
)
where the function g is given in Proposition 5.4. Since q(λy) = λq(y) and Y˜ 1 = λY
1
for λ ≥ 0 (see
Proposition 5.8), it is easy to complete the proof. 
Remark 5.4 Results similar to Propositions 5.8 and 5.9 are also valid when the initial endowments
satisfy x1 ≤ 0 and x2 ≥ 0. Moreover, by combining the results of the last two sections, we can find a
class of contracts with prices that are independent of initial endowments and positively homogeneous.
Analogous price homogeneity properties can also be established for Bergman’s model. The proofs
are fairly similar to those for the model with partial netting and thus they are not presented here.
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6 Model with Partial Netting and Negotiated Collateral
In the final section, we continue the analysis of the model with partial netting by studying the
case where the collateral amount C is negotiated between the counterparties, in the sense that
it depends on both the hedger’s value V h := V (x1, ϕ, A,C) and the counterparty’s value V
c :=
V (x2, ϕ˜,−A,−C). As in Section 4, we postulate that the collateral satisfies Assumption 4.1. Recall
that in that case we have P h(x1, A, C) = P
h(x1, x2, A, C) and P
c(x2,−A,−C) = P
c(x1, x2,−A,−C),
meaning that the two prices depend on the vector (x1, x2) of initial endowments.
6.1 Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
The following result gives fully-coupled pricing BSDEs for both parties under the assumption that
their initial endowments are non-negative.
Proposition 6.1 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.3 and 4.1 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜l) we have (P h, P c)∗ = Y where (Y, Z) solves the two-dimensional fully-coupled
BSDE {
dYt = Z
∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + g
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
dt+ dAt,
YT = 0,
(6.1)
where g = (g1, g2)∗, A = (A,A)∗ and for all y = (y1, y2)
∗ ∈ R2, z = (z1, z2) ∈ R
d×2,
g1(t, y, z) = rlt(B
l
t)
−1z∗1St − (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
i
1S
i
t)
+ − x1B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
+ rlt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(z
i
1S
i
t)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(z
i
1S
i
t)
−
)− (6.2)
and
g2(t, y, z) = rlt(B
l
t)
−1z∗2St + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (−z
i
2S
i
t)
+ + x2B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
− rlt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(−z
i
2S
i
t)
−
)+
+ rbt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(−z
i
2S
i
t)
−
)−
.
(6.3)
In the remainder of this section, we work under Assumption 3.4 and we study the valuation and
hedging of a European contingent claim (HT , C). We note that BSDE (6.1) becomes{
dYt = Ztσ(t, St) dWt + (g
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
+ σ(t, St)atZt) dt+ dAt,
YT = 0,
(6.4)
where the process a is given by (3.15). As in Section 4.3, it suffices to examine the following BSDE{
dYt = Zt dW˜
l
t + g
(
t, Yt, (σ(t, St))
−1Zt
)
dt,
YT = (−HT ,−HT )
∗.
We are now in a position to study the range of fair bilateral prices at time t for a collateralized
European claim.
Proposition 6.2 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.3, 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3 be valid. For any
collateralized European claim (HT , C) where HT ∈ L
2(Ω,FT , P˜
l) we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−HT ,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, HT , C), P˜
l − a.s.
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Proof. Let σ−1t := (σ(t, St))
−1. It is sufficient to check that the functions
h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −g
1
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2
)
and
h2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −g
2
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2
)
where g1 and g2 are given by (6.2) and (6.3) with d = 1, satisfy Assumption 4.2 and condition (4.13).
It is easy to check that Assumption 4.2 holds. We will check that condition (4.13) is satisfied as
well. We set
δ1 := y
+
1 + y2 + q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2) + x1B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1σ−1t ((z1 + z2)St)
−
and
δ2 := −y2 − q̂(−y
+
1 − y2,−y2) + x2B
l
t + (B
l
t)
−1σ−1t (−z2St)
−.
Then
h1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)
= −g1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, σ
−1
t (z1 + z2), σ
−1
t z2) + g
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, σ
−1
t (z1 + z2), σ
−1
t z2)
= −rlt(B
l
t)
−1σ−1t z1St + (B
l
t)
−1r
1,b
t (σ
−1
t (z1 + z2)St)
+ + (Blt)
−1r
1,b
t (−σ
−1
t z2St)
+
+ (x1 + x2)B
l
tr
l
t − r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 ) + r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ).
Since rlt ≤ r
b
t , we have
rlt(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ) ≤ r
l
t(δ1 + δ2)
= rlty
+
1 + (x1 + x2)B
l
tr
l
t + r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1((σ−1t (z1 + z2)St)
− + (−σ−1t z2St)
−).
Thus, using r1,bt ≥ r
l
t, we obtain
h1(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)− h
2(t, y+1 + y2, y2, z1 + z2, z2)
≥ −rlty
+
1 − r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1σ−1t z1St + (B
l
t)
−1r
1,b
t (σ
−1
t (z1 + z2)St)
+ + (Blt)
−1r
1,b
t (−σ
−1
t z2St)
+
− rlt(B
l
t)
−1((σ−1t (z1 + z2)St)
− + (−σ−1t z2St)
−)
= −rlty
+
1 + (B
l
t)
−1(r1,bt − r
l
t)(σ
−1
t (z1 + z2)St)
+ + (Blt)
−1(r1,bt − r
l
t)(−σ
−1
t z2St)
+ ≥ −rlty
+
1 .
Using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4.4, we conclude that (4.13) holds. 
6.2 Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
We conclude the paper by studying the case of initial endowments of opposite signs.
Proposition 6.3 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 and Assumptions 3.5 and 4.1 be valid. For any contract (A,C)
such that A ∈ A(P˜β) we have (P h, P c)∗ = Ŷ where (Ŷ , Ẑ) solves the two-dimensional fully-coupled
BSDE {
dŶt = Ẑ
∗
t dS˜
cld
t + ĝ
(
t, Ŷt, Ẑt
)
dt+ dAt,
ŶT = 0,
(6.5)
where ĝ = (ĝ1, ĝ2)∗, A = (A,A)∗ and for all y = (y1, y2)
∗ ∈ R2, z = (z1, z2) ∈ R
d×2,
ĝ1(t, y, z) =
∑d
i=1 z
i
1β
i
tS
i
t − x1B
l
tr
l
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
+ rlt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t − z
∗
1St
)+
− rbt
(
y1 + q̂(−y1,−y2) + x1B
l
t − z
∗
1St
)− (6.6)
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and
ĝ2(t, y, z) =
∑d
i=1 z
i
1β
i
tS
i
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (−z
i
2S
i
t)
+ + x2B
b
t r
b
t − r
c
t q̂(−y1,−y2)
− rlt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
b
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(z
i
2S
i
t)
−
)+
+ rbt
(
− y2 − q̂(−y1,−y2) + x2B
b
t + (B
l
t)
−1
∑d
i=1(z
i
2S
i
t)
−
)−
.
(6.7)
Let Assumptions 3.4 and 3.5 be satisfied. Then
dS˜cldt =
(
µ(t, St) + κ(t, St)− βtSt
)
dt+ σ(t, St) dWt
and BSDE (6.5) becomes{
dYt = Ztσ(t, St) dWt + (ĝ
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
+ σ(t, St)btZt) dt+ dAt,
YT = 0,
where the process b is given by (4.18). As in Section 4.3, it suffices to examine the following BSDE{
dYt = Zt dW˜
β
t + ĝ
(
t, Yt, (σ(t, St))
−1Zt
)
dt,
YT = (−HT ,−HT )
∗,
where W˜ β is a Brownian motion under an equivalent probability measure P˜β.
Proposition 6.4 Let x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0 be such that x1x2 = 0. If Assumptions 3.4, 3.5, 4.1 and 4.4
are met, then for any collateralized European claim (HT , C) such that HT ∈ L
2(Ω,FT , P˜
β) we have,
for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−HT ,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, HT , C), P˜
β − a.s.
Proof. We write, as usual, σ−1t := (σ(t, St))
−1. It is sufficient to check that the functions
h1(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −ĝ
1
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2
)
and
h2(t, y1, y2, z1, z2) := −ĝ
2
(
t, y1, y2, σ
−1
t z1, σ
−1
t z2
)
where ĝ1 and ĝ2 are given by (4.7) and (4.8), respectively, satisfy Assumption 4.2 and condition
(4.13). This is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.7, using x1x2 = 0 and the same computations
as in the proof of Proposition 6.2. The details are left to the reader. 
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